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The main challenge of understanding Sharia in the West is its undefined nature. This 
contradicts the ease with which the term is used in public and political discourse, 
but also in the legal domain, which prides itself on its precision in terminology. This 
article addresses the question: What is the Sharia that Muslims in the West practice? 
To this end, a model is presented that provides tools to describe the complex inter-
action between Sharia, as practiced by Western Muslims, and their Western environ-
ment, and elucidates the ongoing dialectic of this interaction. The model further shows 
how Western Muslims adopt and adapt Sharia by manoeuvring between their specific 
needs in the Western context and the conditions set by that context. From a Western 
perspective, the model shows that issues of Sharia are usually discussed in legal terms, 
while most controversies are not legal but cultural in nature.
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 Introduction
In this article, I propose a conceptual legal-anthropological approach to the 
notion of “Sharia in the West.” Although the term “Sharia” is widely used in 
the West, it is rife with contradiction and confusion. For example, in 2003, 
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that “Sharia clearly diverges from 
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[the European] Convention [on Human Rights] values.”1 The case regarded 
the Turkish state, which had banned the Islamic Refah Party for proclaiming 
its intention to implement Sharia. The ruling is understandable, given the fact 
that members of the Refah Party were issuing threatening remarks when call-
ing for Sharia.2 From a legal point of view, however, the ruling is surprising 
because the Court failed to define what it meant by “Sharia.” If a legal body like 
the Court uses notions that are alien to the legal language of that body, one 
would expect some clarification. But none was given. This makes the ruling 
nebulous, given the fact that Sharia also includes rules pertaining to prayer, 
fasting, and burial. Surely, the Court can hardly consider these contrary to 
European human rights values.
Five years later, on separate occasions in 2008, the Archbishop of Canter-
bury and the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales came to an opposite 
conclusion from that of the European Court: in public speeches they suggested 
that Sharia does not necessarily have to be contradictory to Western legal and 
political values.3 These remarks were met with scorn and outrage.4 But, just 
as in the case of the European Court, both the highest judicial and religious 
authority of England failed to clearly define what they meant by “Sharia.”
The contradictory use of the notion of Sharia in a Western context illustrates 
the ongoing confusion about the meaning of this term. This is understand-
able, given the widely divergent Sharia practices we witness nowadays, ranging 
from violent and oppressive practices by isis or Taliban to the tolerance and 
1 echr, Refah vs. Turkey, 13 February 2003, Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98. For 
commentaries, see Kevin Boyle, “Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party 
Case”, 1 Essex Human Rights Review (2004), 1; David Schilling, “European Islamaphobia and 
Turkey – Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey”, 26 Loyola Los Angeles Law Rev of Int and 
Comp Law (2004), 501.
2 These remarks included: “We shall certainly call to account those who turn their backs on the 
precepts of the Koran and those who deprive Allah’s Messenger of his jurisdiction in their 
country;” “This system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little longer. Let us see 
what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and 
hatred they feel in their hearts;” “If anyone attacks me I will strike back. I will fight to the end 
to introduce Sharia.” (echr, ibid).
3 Rowan Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England: a religious perspective”, 10 Ecclesiasti-
cal Law Journal (2008), 262; Lord Phillips, Equality before the Law: Speech by Lord Phillips, Lord 
Chief Justice (London Muslim Centre, 2008).
4 See the commentaries in Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney (eds.) Shari’a in the West (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2010).
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generosity practiced by many other Muslims. We find similar contradictions in 
the centuries-old classical legal scholarship that is also called Sharia, and that 
has produced a vast volume of literature with a multitude of interpretations. 
Given these conflicting manifestations of Sharia, it is striking that in public, 
legal, and political discourse, both Muslims and non-Muslims see so little need 
in explaining the term, but keep referring to it with self-evident assurance.
By contrast, in academic circles one finds more nuanced definitions of 
Sharia. But whereas the notion of “Sharia in the West” is gradually becoming 
a field of research in its own right, comprehensive characterizations of what 
this notion entails are absent. This has to do with the different disciplinary and 
geographic approaches that are applied to the subject. For instance, Sharia in 
the West is often studied from the point of view of the effects that contem-
porary practices and laws of Muslim majority countries may have in Western 
societies, some scholars focusing on the practices in these countries,5 others 
studying the ways in which these foreign Sharia laws are applied in Western 
courts through international private law.6 This approach has its relevance, but 
it fails to address the domestic and autonomous practices of Sharia by Muslims 
in the West. Research on this topic is gradually emerging, but is still scant and 
dispersed over various domains of interest. The domain that receives the most 
academic attention is Islamic family law, either as it is practiced by  Muslims 
(this domain is still little researched),7 or as it is manifest in the so-called 
5 See, e.g., Jorgen S. Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen (eds.) Shari‘a As Discourse. Legal Tradi-
tions and the Encounter with Europe (Routledge, 2010).
6 See, e.g., Andrea Büchler, Islamic Law in Europe? Legal Pluralism and its Limits in European 
Family Laws (Routledge, 2011); Pauline M. Kruiniger, Islamic divorces in Europe. Bridging the 
gap between European and Islamic legal orders (2014); Julie Macfarlane, Islamic Divorce in 
North America: A Shari’a Path in a Secular Society (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); Asifa Quraishi 
and Najeeba Syeed-Miller, “No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the United States” 
in Lynn Welchman (ed.), Women’s Rights & Islamic Family Law (2004), 179; Iris D.A. Spor-
tel, “Maybe I’m still his wife”. Transnational divorce in Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Egyptian 
families (Radboud Univ. Nijmegen, 2014); Emily L. Thompson and Soniya F. Yunus, “Choice 
of Laws or Choice of Culture: How Western Nations Treat the Islamic Marriage Contract in 
Domestic Courts”, 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2007), 361.
7 See, e.g., Lucy Carrol, “Application of the law. Muslim women and ‘Islamic divorce’ in 
England”, 17 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (1997), 97; Annelies Moors, “Unregistered 
Islamic Marriages: Anxieties about Sexuality and Islam in the Netherlands”, in Maurits 
S. Berger (ed.), Applying Sharia in the West. Facts, Fears and the Future of Rules of Islam 
on Family Relations in the West (2013), 141; Emmanuelle Santelli and Beate Collet, “Le 
mariage ‘halal’: Réinterprétation des rites du mariage musulman dans le contexte post-
migratoire français”, Recherches familiales (2012), 83; Gaby Starssburger, “Auf die Liebe 
kommt es an! – Beziehungsideale und – entscheidungen junger Muslime”, in Hans-Jürgen 
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 Muslim  arbitration tribunals.8 Another domain of academic interest is the 
Western case law regarding the freedom of religion.9 A third field of research 
that receives substantial attention is the increasing body of fatwas issued for 
the benefit of Muslims in the West, and in particular the development of the 
so-called “Fiqh for minorities” (fiqh al-aqalliyat).10 Our current understanding 
 von  Wensierski and Claudia Lübcke (eds.), Junge Muslime in Deutschland: Lebenslagen, 
Aufwachsprozesse und Jugendkulturen (Barbara Budrich, 2007), 195; Ihsan Yilmaz, “The 
challenge of post-modern legality and Muslim legal pluralism in England”, 28 Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies (2002), 343.
8 For the uk, see, e.g., Samia Bano, Islamic Dispute Resolution and Family Law (2011); Jessie 
Brechin, “A Study of the Use of Sharia Law in Religious Arbitration in the United King-
dom and the Concerns that this Raises for Human Rights”, 15 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 
(2013), 293; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: cultural differences and women’s 
rights (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011); Sonia N. Shah-Kazemi, Untying the Knot: Muslim 
Women, Divorce and the Shariah (Nuttfield Foundation, 2001); Jemma Wilson, “The Sharia 
Debate in Britain: Sharia Councils and the Oppression of Muslim Women”, 1 Aberdeen 
Student Law Review (2010), 46. For Canada, see, e.g., Natasha Bakht, “Family Arbitration 
Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s Arbitration Act and its Impact on Women”, Mus-
lim World Journal of Human Rights (2004), 1; Lynne Cohen, “Inside the Beit Din”, 5 Cana-
dian Lawyer (2000), 27. For the Netherlands, see, e.g., Laurens G.H. Bakker et al., Sharia in 
Nederland. Een studie naar islamitische advisering en geschilbeslechting bij moslims in Ned-
erland (2010); Maurits S. Berger, “De (on)mogelijkheid van Sharia in Nederland. Met voor-
stellen voor toepassing van islamitisch familierecht”, in Katharina Boele-Woelki (eds.), 
Actuele ontwikkelingen in het familierecht (Ars Aequi, 2015), 69. For a general discussion, 
see Mathias Rohe, “Alternative Dispute Resolution in Europe under the Auspices of Reli-
gious Norms”, 6 RELIGARE Working Paper (2011). <http://www.religareproject.eu/system/
files/Alternative%20Dispute%20Resolution%20by%20Rohe%20e-version.pdf>.
9 Carolyn Evans, “The ‘Islamic Scarf ’ in the European Court of Human Rights”, 7 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law (2006), 52; Dominic McGoldrick “Accommodating Muslims 
in Europe: From Adopting Shari῾a Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs from Generally Ap-
plicable Laws”, 9 Human Rights Law Review (2009), 603; Robin Griffith-Jones (ed.), Islam 
and English Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a (2013); Mathias Rohe, 
Muslim Minorities and the Law in Europe: Chances and Challenges (2007).
10 See, e.g., Ṭaha J. Alwani, Towards a fiqh for Minorities (International Institute for Islamic 
Thought, 2000); Alexandre Caeiro, Fatwas for European Muslims: The Minority Fiqh Proj-
ect and the Integration of Islam in Europe (2011); Dilwar Hussain, “Muslim Political Par-
ticipation in Britain and the ‘Europeanisation’ of Fiqh”, 3 Die Welt des Islams (2004), 376; 
Shammai Fishman, Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities (Center on 
Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World, 2006); Tareq Oubrou, Introduc-
tion théorique à la charî‘a de Minorité (Oumma, 2000). <http://oumma.com/Introduction 
-theorique-a-la-chari>; Youssef Qaradawi, Fiqh of Muslim Minorities (New Vision, n.d.); 
Said F. Hassan, “Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt: Negotiating Discourse of Tradition, Modernity and 
Reform”, 5 Faculty of Languages and Translation’s Journal (2013), 219.
Berger
journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273
<UN>
240
of Sharia in the West is therefore fragmented qualitatively (the interpretations 
and manifestations of Sharia) and almost absent quantitatively (the practices 
of Sharia, and the number of Muslims adhering to them).
The different approaches to Sharia in the West and its manifestations  warrant 
a comprehensive consideration. To do so, I expound a  legal-anthropological 
model that can be used to reach an integrated understanding of this complex 
notion. The two basic questions I address when speaking of Sharia in the West 
are “What are we talking about?” and “What should we be talking about?” Shar-
ia in the West, which has become a standard expression in practice as well as in 
academia, will serve as our central point of reference. The construction of this 
model therefore, involves the reconsideration of several basic notions: What is 
law? What makes a rule Islamic? What do we mean by “the West” and Western 
values? We must also take into account the interaction between Sharia and the 
Western legal and societal structures in which it is embedded. This dimension 
is crucial to our understanding of Sharia in the West, because there is a contin-
uous dialectic going on between the different ways in which Sharia is practiced 
and interpreted by Muslims in the West, and the various Western responses to 
these practices and interpretations.11
Below I present the step-by-step construction of this model of Sharia in the 
West, in three parts. In the first part I address the notion of Sharia, with empha-
sis on what Muslims in Western societies do and want with respect to Sharia. 
I review the manners in which Sharia is being applied by Western Muslims, 
and the domains in which they do so, which in many instances are particular 
to a Western context. In the second part I discuss the Western environment in 
which this Sharia operates, and the Western responses to Sharia. Analysis of 
these responses shows that they can be divided into two categories, political-
legal and religious-cultural. In the third part I demonstrate that Sharia in the 
West is not a mere injection of a fossilized and alien legal system into Western 
societies, but the result of a dialectic between the two, which is still in a pro-
cess of development.
11 This dialectic has been an important part of my research; see, e.g., “The Third Wave: 
Islamization of Europe, or Europanization of Islam?”, 2 Journal of Muslims in Europe 
(2013), 115–136; “Introduction: Applying Shari’a in the West”, in Maurits S. Berger (ed.), 
Applying Shari’a in the West (2013), 7–22; “Responding to Sharia in the Netherlands”, 
(33–34)  Canadian Journal of Netherlandic Studies / Revue Canadienne des études Néer-
landaises (2014), 129–152; Maurits S. Berger, A Brief History of Islam in Europe. Thirteen 
Centuries of Creed, Conflict and Coexistence (Leiden Univ. Press (2014), in particular the 
last two chapters).
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Part i Sharia
1 Representations of Sharia
The main challenge in understanding what Sharia entails is that it is not a sin-
gular notion, nor a code of law contained in a corpus of legal rules. In the mod-
ern Muslim world, it survives in three forms: as scholarship, as a set of rules 
inserted into the modern legal system, and as a slogan. I briefly consider each 
of these representations to explain their relevance to our discussion of Sharia 
in the West.
1.1 Classical Legal Scholarship
Islamic classical legal scholarship, that is, the scholarship developed in the ear-
ly centuries of Islam and which is part of Islamic orthodoxy, is not preoccupied 
with the production of rules, as is the case, for instance, in canon law, but with 
the science of finding and interpreting rules.12 Over the centuries, this scholar-
ship has yielded a massive volume of literature comprising a host of rules and 
interpretations. The fact that many of these interpretations differ from one an-
other is not considered problematic from the Islamic scholarly point of view, 
because the essence of this scholarship is that one makes a serious intellectual 
effort (ijtihad) to come to a solution, thereby allowing for different scholars to 
have different opinions.
Islamic legal scholarship defined two areas in which human relations are 
expressed: one between man and God (ibadat), the other between man and 
man (mu’amalat). The first category comprises actions like prayer, fasting, 
and burial, which one would nowadays call religious rituals and which mod-
ern legal standards regard as situated outside the realm of law. The relations 
between men, by contrast, typically pertain to the modern concept of law. 
Islamic legal scholarship, however, limited itself to only a few fields of law: 
family law, financial transactions, a small number of crimes, and some general 
rules on arbitration and government. All other fields of law, therefore, were not 
subject to scholarly scrutiny, but pertained to the realm of worldly rule (sulta).13 
The ruler would uphold Sharia on one hand, and promulgate laws according to 
12 e.g., Khaled Abou El Fadl, Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari’ah in the Modern Age 
(2014); Wael B. Hallaq, Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (2009); Mohammed H. 
Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction (2008).
13 Ira M. Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic 
Society”, 6 International Journal of Middle East Studies (1975), 363; Knut S. Vikør, Between 
God and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (2006) 185ff.
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his own wishes on the other, as long as they were not in violation of the basic 
tenets of Sharia.
1.2 Modern Applications
The second representation of Sharia is its actual practice. In the modern Mus-
lim world, this has taken two forms: either as a code of conduct practiced out-
side state rule, or as a set of rules of the state legal system.14
Sharia as a code of conduct can be practiced or applied outside the 
sphere of state rule either within a small communal setting, or in the form 
of a broader enforcement of such codes by militant groups like the  Taliban 
or isis. This form of Sharia has many different manifestations,  ranging 
from militant and harsh applications to a wide variety of Islamic char-
ity organizations and sustainable development initiatives in the private 
domain.15
Sharia as legislation is a novelty, dating from the late 19th century, when 
some domains of Islamic legal scholarship were codified. Because the exten-
sive corpus of Islamic scholarship contained many alternatives and even con-
tradictions, the legislators had to make choices. For example, most Muslim 
majority countries have codified Islamic family law into a single, national law, 
but the family laws of, for instance, Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, and Tunisia differ 
in many respects.16 Since the second half of the 20th century, codification on 
the basis of Islamic principles has gained popularity in many Muslim coun-
tries, but again, within their national contexts. Many typical features of the 
modern nation state, like a legislature and judiciary, at times combined with 
a  monarchy or a democracy, are maintained within the self-declared Islamic 
polity, although these institutions have little basis in classical Islamic legal 
scholarship.
14 Maurits S. Berger, “Sharia and the Nation State”, in Rudolph Peters and Peri Bearman 
(eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Islamic Law (2014), 223; Jan M. Otto, Sharia 
Incorporated. A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in 
Past and Present (2011).
15 The latter is also known as “green Islam,” see, e.g., Zeyneb Hafsa Aström, “Paradigm 
Shift for Sustainable Development: The Contribution of Islamic Economics”, 1 Journal 
of Economic and Social Studies (2011); Mnawar Iqbal (ed.), Islamic Perspectives on Sus-
tainable Development (2005); Zubair Hasan, “Sustainable development from an Islamic 
Perspective: meaning implications and policy concerns”, 19 jkau: Islamic Economics 
(2006), 3.
16 Berger, supra note 14; Otto, supra note 14.
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The modern interpretations and appearances of Sharia in its social, legal, 
and constitutional forms are quite unique in the history of Sharia. Although 
many of these interpretations have become popular in the Muslim world, they 
are not without criticism. Some critics disagree about the right interpretation 
of certain rules of Islam, while others argue that modern applications of so-
called Sharia are not in conformity with the tenets of Islamic legal scholarship.17
1.3 Slogan
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the representation of Sharia as what I 
suggest to call a slogan.18 The term “Sharia” has a strong and positive reverbera-
tion among devout Muslims, irrespective of what Sharia is or how it is applied. 
Sharia stands for something “good.” In this respect, it can be compared to the 
term “justice,” which also stands for something good, even if there is much 
controversy regarding its exact meaning and application. This is not to say that 
Sharia is the equivalent of justice, but the slogan mechanism in both instances 
is similar. Sharia is extremely powerful in this sense: no devout Muslim would 
disavow Sharia (as has been suggested by some Western politicians as a condi-
tion for Muslim integration); and for many Muslims living in poverty or under 
oppression, Sharia has become a utopian solution.
1.4 Sharia as Lived Practice
These three representations refer to the notion of Sharia in general, with a 
focus on Muslim majority countries. What representations do we encounter 
when we shift our focus on the manifestation of Sharia in the West? Studying 
Sharia as either Islamic scholarship or as practices in individual Muslim coun-
tries is of little use in answering this question, because neither manifestation 
reflects or explains the situation and practice of Sharia in the West. Because 
there is no written code of Sharia, let alone one of Sharia in the West, nor any 
other comprehensive recording of Sharia jurisprudence or practices in the 
West, the only approach that may provide us with sufficient answers is Sharia 
as a lived practice. To explore this practice, we must zoom in on what Muslims 
in the West want or mean by Sharia, and what they do in connection with it.
17 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name. Islamic Law, Authority and Women (2001), 
171; Wael A.B. Hallaq “Can the Shari’a be restored?”, in Yvonne Y. Haddad and Barbara F. 
Stowasser (eds.), Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity (2004), 22.
18 Maurits S. Berger, “Sharia – A Flexible Notion”, 35 Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie (2006), 
335–345.
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2 What Do Muslims in the West Want and Do in Terms of Sharia?
2.1 What Do Muslims in the West Mean by Sharia?
To my knowledge, only three surveys have been conducted among Muslims in 
European countries, and two among Muslims worldwide, in which Muslims 
were asked their opinion about Sharia. In a 2008, a Gallup poll held in ten Mus-
lim majority countries, which claimed a representation of 80% of Muslims 
worldwide, Sharia and (to the surprise of many) democracy shared joint first 
place on the list of what Muslims found important in their lives.19 A Pew survey 
in 2013 yielded a similar result, with the wish to “make Sharia the official law 
in the country” scoring high, especially in Asian Muslim majority countries.20
These two worldwide surveys, however, did not cover Western countries 
with Muslim minority populations. Only three surveys have covered this 
ground. One was conducted in 2004 in the Netherlands, and found that 51% 
of Dutch Muslims interviewed favoured a Muslim political party, and 29.5% 
thought that its political program should be based on Sharia.21 The other two 
surveys were conducted in the uk, in 2006 and 2007. According to the 2006 
 survey, 40% of the 500 British Muslim respondents said that they would sup-
port the introduction of Sharia in predominantly Muslim areas of Britain, and 
91% of respondents declared themselves “loyal towards Britain.”22 The 2007 
study found that 28% of British Muslims would prefer to live under Sharia 
law.23
Sharia obviously enjoys a favorable standing among Muslims. But none of 
these five surveys defined Sharia, nor did they ask their respondents to do so, 
therefore failing to shed light on what the Muslim respondents meant by Shar-
ia. Does it appeal to them as a slogan for righteousness, as a religious code of 
conduct, or as a harsh Taliban-like system? The surveys do not make this clear.
19 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really 
Think (2008).
20 The Pew Forum, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society (April 30, 2013 <http://
www.pewforum.org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society.aspx>).
21 To be more exact, 10.2% of the respondents who favoured a Muslim political party, an-
swered the question “Should the programme of this party be based on Sharia?” with “Yes, 
entirely” and 19.3% answered “Yes, to some extent” (Foquz Etnomarketing, “Onderzoek-
sresultaten ‘Politieke Voorkeuren Moslims’ t.b.v. Redactie Nova”, Nieuwegein: Foquz Etno-
marketing, December 2004, 10–12).
22 icm Research survey among 500 Muslims, February 2006, <http://www.icmunlimited 
.com/pdfs/2006_february_sunday_telegraph_muslims_poll.pdf>.
23 Munira Mirza et al., Living Apart Together. British Muslims and the Paradox of Multicultur-
alism (2007).
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2.2 What Do Muslims in the West Do in Terms of Sharia?
In the absence of well-founded insight into what Muslims in the West or 
worldwide mean by Sharia, or what they want with respect to Sharia, our next 
best option is to come to an understanding of what Muslims in the West do 
with respect to Sharia. This approach is not entirely satisfactory either, because 
it overlooks the possibility that some Muslims may wish to practice certain 
forms of Sharia but are prevented from doing so by their social or legal environ-
ment (as for example, wearing the burqa in countries like France and Belgium, 
gender separation in public places, or applying Islamic corporal punishments). 
Some Muslims may entertain ideas of a social and legal order, whether com-
munal or national, that are disallowed as a threat to state security.24 We must 
therefore acknowledge that until a thorough survey on this question is con-
ducted we can only speculate about the intentions of Muslims in the West.
Taking into consideration this lacuna in our approach, I limit our model to 
that of the Sharia expressed or practiced by Muslims in the West. To this end, it 
is useful to consider three legal domains where we observe Sharia being prac-
ticed in the West: national law, foreign law through international private law, 
and informal legal practices.25
2.2.1 National Law
Few rules of Islamic law are part of a Western national law. One example is that 
of the so-called Sharia courts, which exist in the Greek province of Western 
Thrace, headed by muftis. These courts pronounce marriages and divorces as 
a  matter of state law.26 By contrast, the Sharia councils in the uk are not state 
recognized. Another example is national laws that make specific allowances 
for  Islamic religious rituals, such as burial rites, ritual slaughter, and dietary 
requirements in government facilities. In the uk, special provisions were made 
by law in 2003 to accommodate Islamic financial instruments. Furthermore, 
24 Although most security services focus on acts of violence as a threat to national security, 
some, like the Dutch security service (aivd), also consider certain lifestyles in secluded 
communities (“parallel societies”) as a potential source of radicalization, and therefore a 
threat to national security (aivd, The radical dawa in transition, The rise of Islamic neo-
radicalism in the Netherlands, 2008).
25 For general and updated insights into European judicial and legislative issues, see the an-
nual publication of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe (Brill: published since 2009).
26 Photini Pazartzis, “Le Status des Minorités en Grèce”, 38 Annuaire Francais de Droit Inter-
national (1992), 377; Konstantinos Tsitselikis, “The Legal Status of Islam in Greece”, 44 Die 
Welt des Islams (2004), 402; Angeliki Ziaka, “Greece. Debates and Challenges”, in Maurits 
S. Berger (ed.), Applying Sharia in the West. Facts, Fears and the Future of Rules of Islam on 
Family Relations in the West (2013), 125.
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Western courts may occasionally consider rules of Islamic law, for example, the 
dower of an Islamic marriage, which is considered part of an agreement and as 
such is treated as a matter of civil contract law,27 or Islamic financial rules that 
have been incorporated in contractual agreements.
2.2.2 Foreign Law through International Private Law
The second domain where Sharia law is being practiced in a Western context 
is international private law. National rules of international private law may re-
quire a Western national judge to apply a foreign law to a domestic case, or 
to recognize a foreign legal situation. If such foreign laws or acts are based 
on Islamic law,28 strictly speaking, the Western court applies Sharia. But if the 
provisions of these foreign national Sharia laws are considered contrary to 
fundamental legal principles of a given Western country, the so-called public 
policy or public order, then such application may be prohibited. Public policy 
has been invoked in particular in the case of polygamous marriage and unilat-
eral divorce (talaq). For example, in the case of Iranian, Pakistani, or Moroc-
can nationals in Western countries, the judge of a national Western court must 
by virtue of the rules of international private law consider the applicability of 
their Iranian, Pakistani, or Moroccan national family laws. But in the case of 
polygamy and unilateral divorce, which are valid under these foreign laws, the 
Western judge may invoke public policy to deny their applicability under the 
Western jurisdiction.
2.2.3 Informal Legal Practices
Informal legal practices make up the third form of Sharia practices in the West. 
These practices of a legal nature are initiated by individuals, outside state struc-
tures or impositions. Examples include Islamic marriages conducted in homes 
or mosques, private conflict settlement in accordance with Islamic tenets, and 
the observance of religious rituals. Such informal practices may or may not 
interact with the domains of national law or international private law. I expect 
this domain of informal Sharia to gain in importance among Muslims in the 
27 Lee Ann Bambach, “Save us from ‘Save Our State’: anti-Sharia legislative efforts across 
the United States and their impact”, 13 Journal of Islamic Law and Culture (2011), 77; 
Ursula Günther, Martin Herzog, and Stephanie Müssig, “Researching Mahr in Germany: 
A Multidisciplinary Approach”, 49 Review of Middle East Studies (2015), 23; Nadjma Yassari 
“Understanding and Use of Islamic Family Law Rules in German Courts: The Example 
of the Mahr”, in Maurits S. Berger (ed.), Applying Sharia in the West. Facts, Fears and the 
Future of Rules of Islam on Family Relations in the West (2013), 165.
28 See Bambach, supra note 6.
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West, first, because of the increasing religiousness of the new generations,29 
and a corresponding growing wish to live in accordance to the rules of Islam, 
and second, because Muslim communities are becoming more established in 
the Western environment. These communities need to handle their religious 
affairs autonomously, among others, by creating institutional frameworks in-
dependent from their countries of origin.
As noted, little is known about the precise quantity and quality of these 
practices and manifestations, because research on this topic is scant. But 
based on research that has been conducted to date, it is possible to construct a 
general picture of informal Sharia, as practiced in the West. According to this 
picture, devout Muslims in the West are committed to living in accordance 
with Sharia, a commitment limited to the following three domains:
1. Religious rules, such as those pertaining to prayer, fasting, burial, dietary 
laws, and dress code (known in Islam as ibadat);
2. Contractual rules relating to family relations (including marriage and di-
vorce), and to financial transactions (known in Islam as mu’amalat);
3. Interactions within the Muslim community and with non-Muslims (in-
cluding gender issues, political participation, etc.).
Several observations can be made with regard to these three manifestations of 
Sharia rules. First, these rules do not include domains of Islamic law like crimi-
nal law and state law. Second, this collection of rules appears quite random, 
both in scope and in content. From an Islamic legal-theological perspective, 
however, there is an internal logic to it, because these rules share a high rank-
ing in the hierarchy of Islamic rules prescribed by classical legal scholarship: 
they are explicitly mentioned in the Koran, by the Prophet, or by scholarly con-
sensus, and are therefore the first to be followed by any devout Muslim, and the 
last to be compromised on. In other words, these rules pertain to the essential 
substance of Islamic religion.
The third observation is that according to legal standards of most modern 
states, only the rules relating to family relations and financial transactions can 
be considered law or legal rules. The other rules pertain to religious rituals or 
social conduct, and as such have to do with the individuals’ freedom to shape 
their religion and conduct. From an Islamic perspective, however, all human 
conduct, whether individual or communal, is governed by Sharia.
Fourth, these domains of Sharia pertain to the daily lives of Muslims, and 
appear to have little to do with the totalitarian schemes of an Islamic state 
29 Indicated by various national surveys and studies in Europe.
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or with political views on an Islamic restructuring of Western societies. Of 
course, such views do exist among some radical Muslims, just as there are Mus-
lim extremists who interpret Sharia as a justification to declare their fellow 
 Muslims heretics, or to call for militant action against alleged Western injus-
tices.  Although such people are the source of security concerns, the majority 
of Muslims in the West uphold a much less radical interpretation of Sharia. It 
must therefore be clear that for each of the three domains of Sharia rules in 
the West, we must consider that they can be interpreted by Muslims in liberal 
as well as conservative, and even in extremist ways. For instance, with regard 
to the interaction with non-Muslims, we can observe a wide array of practices 
by Muslims, ranging from participation to segregation and from isolation to 
aggressive rejection. We will discuss this in more detail in Part III below.
3 (De)constructing Sharia in the West
The preceding paragraphs provided some crude building blocks to construct 
a notion of Sharia in the West. We have identified the social-legal domains 
where Sharia in the West is applicable, but we do not yet have a clear view on 
how it is applied. To do so requires a legal-anthropological approach.  Although 
the theories and methodologies of such an approach are well developed, they 
have hardly been applied to Sharia,30 and even less so to Sharia in the West.31 
We therefore have to tailor-make our own approach.
3.1 The Nature of the Rules
To start constructing our model, we must begin by reconsidering the term 
“Sharia,” which we have used consequently until now, but which I find prob-
lematic for several reasons. First, we have seen that the term “Sharia” has 
acquired emotive and ambiguous meanings, both for its supporters and op-
ponents, which may interfere with achieving an unbiased view of its exact 
meaning and practice. Second, in Islamic legal theory, the term “Sharia” stands 
for a comprehensive legal-theological system that includes a vast scholarly 
30 For such a legal-anthropological approach with regard to Sharia in Muslim-majority 
countries, see Baudouin Dupret, “La sharî’a comme référent legislative. Du droit positif à 
l’anthropologie du droit”, 25 Egypte Monde Arabe (1996), 121, and “What Is Islamic law? A 
praxiological answer and an Egyptian case study”, 24 Theory, Culture and Society (2007), 
79; Baudouin Dupret, Maurits S. Berger, and Laila al-Zwaini (eds.), Legal Pluralism in the 
Arab World (Brill, 1999).
31 An exception is the research conducted into the nature of Sharia councils in the uk: see 
the articles mentioned after “United Kingdom,” supra note 8.
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tradition and legal culture. As we have seen, this does not fully correspond 
with what we observe in the West, where Muslims opt for the observance of 
only a selection of rules, and perhaps not always do so in agreement with the 
tenets of Islamic legal theory.
What term should we use then? Some scholars prefer “Islamic law” over 
Sharia, but this is not satisfactory because law implies a form of state regulation 
or endorsement, which is not the case for Sharia in the West.32 Another option 
is proposed by legal anthropologists who have correctly pointed out that all 
guiding principles, whether inspired by state law, religion, organizational by-
laws, or parents, are norms.33 Some scholars have therefore opted for “Muslim 
legal norms” and “Islamic norms” when discussing the situation of Muslims in 
the West.34 But I do not find this terminology satisfactory either, because the 
term “norms” does not do justice to the experience of the devout Muslims who 
abide by what the Islam prescribes for them to do. From the perspective of the 
believer, the term “norms” is too contingent and incidental compared to the 
more comprehensive and commanding nature of what Islam stipulates.
For the purpose of our model I therefore prefer to use the term “rules of 
Islam,” which I define as the set of religiously motivated rules practised by 
Muslims in the West. Rules of Islam do not represent an absolute and singular 
Sharia, but a relative notion that depends on the meaning, interpretation, and 
practice attributed to Sharia by Muslims. As mentioned, this set of rules is not 
necessarily equal to that of the legal-theological doctrine developed by clas-
sical Islamic scholarship. The next step is therefore to come to a clear under-
standing of where these rules come from.
3.2 The Production of the Rules
Although a Muslim individual or community may state that they practice rules 
of Islam derived from sacred sources, the approach of our model is that the 
source, the internal motivation, or the justification of these rules is of little rele-
vance because we are interested only in the manifestation of this rule. Similarly, 
32 An-Na’im argued succinctly: “Norms regulating family relations can be religious as long as 
they are not enforced through state law, but once enforced, they become simply state law 
rules, regardless of their perceived religious sources” (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, “Religious 
Norms and Family Law: Is it Legal or Normative Pluralism”, 25 Emory International Law 
Review (2011), 792).
33 See, e.g., William Twining, “Normative And Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective”, 20 
Duke Journal Of Comparative & International Law (2010), 473.
34 Malik opts for the term “Muslim legal and ethical norms” (Maleiha Malik, Muslim Legal 
Norms and the Integration of European Muslims (European University Institute, 2009)) 
and Karčic for “Islamic norms” (Harun H. Karčic, “Applying Islamic norms in Europe”, 35 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (2015), 245).
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the increasing volume of Islamic legal scholarship that regards Muslims 
in the West (the fiqh al-aqalliyat) may be of great interest from an intellec-
tual point of view, but tells us little about its practice by Western Muslims. 
Muslim scholars may come up with all types of Islamic rules tailor-made for 
Muslims in the West, but we simply do not know whether and to what 
extent Muslims in the West adhere to these rules. This has to do with the dif-
ference between text and practice, whereby both the devout Muslim and the 
observer may tend to attach greater importance to the text than to what 
happens in reality. Our model, on the other hand, seeks to facilitate an un-
derstanding of the practice of Sharia. Therefore, I want to avoid any claim on 
what the “right” interpretation or “true” Islam might be, as this would blur our 
view of what is actually happening in relation to Sharia. My aim is to devise a 
model that encompasses all different religious-legal realities of Muslim life in 
the West.
To do so, I turn to the concept of social groups generating or otherwise liv-
ing in accordance with internal rules. This phenomenon has been extensively 
studied and theorized by legal anthropologists.35 Among the many terms they 
use to describe such groups, the term “social-legal entity”36 has the most rel-
evance for the purposes of this model, as it connotes a non-state social entity 
(individual, communal, or institutional) that determines what rules it practic-
es and what rules need to be practiced. The relation of these rules to the state 
is thereby of no relevance. Indeed, some of these communal rules may even be 
contrary to state rules, as is the case with gang rules and many religious rules. 
What counts is the normativity of the rules within these groups.
Based on these considerations, I suggest to rewrite the definition of social-
legal entity for our purposes as follows: the term “Muslim” in our model de-
notes Muslim individuals, communities, and institutions that, as separate or 
amalgamated entities, practice rules that they consider Islamic. (For the sake 
of clarity, it should be noted that there are also Muslim groups and communi-
ties that do not practice such norms.)
35 For example: Bourdieu (“juridical field:” Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a 
Sociology of the Juridical Field”, 38 The Hastings Law Journal (1987), 805); Moore (“semi-
autonomous social field:” Sally F. Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study”, 7 Law and Society Review (1973), 719); 
Smith (“corporations:” Michael G. Smith, Corporations And Society (1974)); and scholars of 
legal pluralism (e.g., John Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?”, 24 Journal of Legal Plural-
ism (1986), 1; Masaji Chiba, “Other Phases of Legal Pluralism in the Contemporary World”, 
3 Ratio Juris (1998), 3).
36 See Chiba, supra note 35.
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3.3 The Practice of the Rules
Having determined what we mean by rules of Islam, and who produces these 
rules, we now come to how they are being practiced. Generally speaking, ad-
herence to rules requires some kind of enforcing agency that, depending on 
the nature of the rules, can be of a formal nature, such as police or judge, or 
of an informal nature, such as one’s parents, one’s peer-group or the sorority’s 
by-laws. In case of Islamic rules, this enforcing agency may be the individual 
Muslim (who may invoke God as the ultimate enforcing agent), social peer 
pressure, the religious authorities, or the state. In Muslim majority countries, 
we see a mixture of all of these, as Islamic rules have become dispersed across 
the private and public, social and legal domains. Muslim majority countries 
have infrastructures of adjudication and consultation, and at times enforce-
ment, either as state institutions (courts, state mufti) or as part of the religious 
establishment (institutions like al-Azhar in Egypt). However, such infrastruc-
ture is lacking or rare in the West (with the exception of South-East European 
countries), so that Muslims are left to their own devices, whereby the main 
problem they face is: Who has the authority to interpret, explain, or adjudi-
cate a rule of Islam?37 This explains why so many Muslims in the West refer to 
Muslim scholars from abroad, and why the Internet plays a prominent role.38
In a Western environment, therefore, the practice of the rules of Islam is 
basically of an informal nature. with the exception of the few aforementioned 
cases of international private law and some national law rules. That means 
that adhering to these rules is voluntary: it is the individual Muslim who de-
cides if and how to apply a rule of Islam, and Muslims effectively become 
their own muftis.39 This being the case, the individual voluntarism does not do 
37 Peter Mandaville, “Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and the 
uk after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology and Authority”, 35 Journal of Ethnic and Mi-
gration Studies (2009), 491–506; W. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, “Religious Authori-
ties of Muslims in the West: Their Views on Political Participation”, in Wael Shadid and 
P.S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Intercultural Relations and Religious Authorities: Muslims in 
the European Union (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 149–170.
38 See, e.g., Maurits S. Berger, “Buying houses, donating organs and fighting wars – the 
changing role of muftis”, Recht van de Islam (2011); Gary R. Bunt, Islam in the Digital Age: 
E-jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments (Pluto Press, 2003); Bettina Gräf 
and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen (eds.), Global mufti: the phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaraḍawi 
(2009); Vit Šisler, “The Internet and the Construction of Islamic Knowledge in Europe”, 
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology (2007), 205–217.
39 Described by Peter Mandaville, “Critical Islam and Citizenship among Muslims in Europe 
& North America”, paper for the international conference on “Migration, Religion and 
Secularism”, Paris, June 17–18, 2005.
Berger
journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273
<UN>
252
 justice to everyday practice: some Muslims are in need of advice regarding the 
rules, some are in need of adjudication by third parties in conflicts with fellow-
Muslims (mostly in matters of marriage and divorce), and some feel restrained 
in their personal practice of rules by peer pressure. I briefly address these three 
situations below.
The first two situations, advice and adjudication, explain the need for au-
thoritative Muslim personalities or institutions in Western societies. To date, 
it seems that such authority is embodied mostly in individuals like imams or 
scholars. But we have seen that there are few of them in the West, or at least 
too few to meet the demand for such authority. And of the few bodies that have 
been established for this purpose, like the so-called Sharia councils in the uk 
and the fiqh councils in America, some have received criticism from Muslims 
for not being representative, or for the pressure that they allegedly exercise, 
particularly on Muslim women.40
Peer pressure is also the main issue in the third situation: Muslims may feel 
limited in their freedom to interpret and practice certain rules of Islam, or to 
not follow rules at all, by social pressure or even coercion by other Muslims, 
such as peers, family, religiously authoritative figures, or the community. This 
pressure does not apply exclusively to Muslims: individuals in any society are 
subject to forms of pressure from their environment. Peer pressure in Muslim 
communities in the West, however, receives considerable public and political 
attention, mostly with regard to the position of women.
In some instances, this social pressure can be aggressive. Examples are 
organizations like Sharia4UK and Sharia4Belgium, which have been known 
for shouting down public meetings on Islam, or the self-proclaimed “Sharia 
patrols” that harassed passers-by because their dress or behaviour was con-
sidered immoral.41 Although such extremist Muslims are generally known for 
their hostility toward Western society, their pressure to conform to stringent 
interpretations of the rules of Islam is exerted mostly on fellow Muslims.
Peer pressure by fellow Muslims may force certain Muslims to submit against 
their will to rules of Islam, or to rules that they disagree with. But peer pres-
sure may also force Muslims to call upon rules of Islam as an escape strategy. 
For example, to avoid parental pressure to marry a candidate of their  parents’ 
choosing or to stop their studies in order to get married, young Muslim women 
40 Bano, supra note 8; Shachar, supra note 8; Shah-Kazemi, supra note 8.
41 This took place in East London in 2013–14, and in Wuppertal in 2014. No academic writ-
ing is yet available on these incidents. See the video posted by the so-called Sharia patrol 
of its own actions: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nw2w7ACogaY>. For media cov-
erage of these actions, see cnn (<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=rcsG-u2GtZE>) and 
Vice news (<https://news.vice.com/video/londons-holy-turf-war>).
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have been known to invoke certain rules of Islam (this will be further discussed 
below in Part III).
For the purpose of this model, we conclude that the informal practice of 
Islamic rules in Western societies is not enforced except by the Muslims them-
selves. Self-enforcement manifests in several forms, including individual vol-
untary practice and peer pressure. Between these two are the personalities or 
bodies that can be given sufficient authority by the Muslims communities to 
exert forms of enforcement.
4 Conclusion: A Definition of Sharia in a Western Context
Based on these considerations, I define the notion of Sharia in the West as 
(a) a set of Islam-motivated rules (b) practiced by Muslim social-legal entities 
(individuals, communities, organizations) in the West, whereby (c) these Mus-
lims are both the defining and the enforcing agency of these rules. The most 
important conclusion that we can draw from this definition is that Sharia is not 
something “out there;” it is defined by people through their words and actions.
Note that this definition is not intended to elucidate why Muslims do certain 
things; it merely determines what they do and how they do it. I believe that 
this is the only way we can come to a clear and objective evaluation of the so-
called Sharia in the West. In doing so, we observe that the Muslims in the West 
are practicing a selective variety of rules of Islam, ranging from prayer and 
charity, through marriage and dress codes, to interaction with the non-Muslim 
environment. These rules are subject to numerous theological interpretations 
and to various forms of practice, ranging from private and friendly to publicly 
confrontational and even violent. This amalgam of rules, interpretations, and 
practices is what we call rules of Islam.
By defining Sharia in this way, we avoid the need to determine whether a 
rule is or is not Islamic. Sharia may be singular in source but not necessarily 
in outcome, and it is this outcome where our main interest lies. For example, 
female genital mutilation (fgm) is considered not Islamic by most Muslim re-
ligious authorities and by majority consensus in Islamic orthodoxy, but it is 
practiced on a wide scale in several Muslim majority countries like Egypt and 
Sudan, where the practitioners consider it to be a rule of Islam. A similar is-
sue arises with violence perpetrated in the name of Islam: to some Muslims, 
certain situations may justify or even call for violence, but such violence is con-
demned by others. In these examples, both sides invoke Sharia  to justify their 
actions. Our model operates under the anthropological thesis that people’s ac-
tions are the determinant factor. From the perspective of Muslim believers, 
this may be highly frustrating, because they are in need of religious certainty. 
Berger
journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273
<UN>
254
But the advantage of this approach is that it prevents the observer from be-
coming mired in discussions about true Islam or real Sharia, and enables him 
to move on to determining whether a certain action or behavior is acceptable 
or not, regardless of its religious qualification or justification.
This brings us to the next conclusion, namely that Sharia is a blanket term 
that needs clarification whenever it is used. Declaring “Sharia” a violation of 
European values, as stated by the European Court, or banning “Sharia,” as has 
been done in the constitutions of several states in the us, may be justified with 
regard to its harsh and intolerant forms promoted or practiced by certain peo-
ple, organizations, or countries. But the presumably unintended result of such 
unqualified use of the term “Sharia” is that the condemnation encompasses 
all rules of Islam, including the religious rituals (like prayer, fasting, and buri-
al) and all practices and interpretations that are in conformity with Western 
values.
Part ii The West
We now come to the second tier of the model in which we identify “the West” 
and the nature of its responses to the rules of Islam practiced by Muslims in 
the West.
1 Defining the West
The notion of “the West” is an oddity at best, as its geographic connotation 
does not hold when one includes Australia, or Japan, or South Africa, or South 
America; and its connotation as a value system disqualifies any geographic ref-
erence. Nevertheless, its use has become so commonplace, especially in con-
nection with the notion of Sharia, that we cannot circumvent it.
For the purpose of this model, I define the West as a geographic region that 
shares certain histories, features, and values. For the sake of brevity, I refer to 
three characteristics that stand out. The first is a shared historical heritage that 
is of European origin, of which the Christian legacy is an important feature.42 
42 The Christian legacy is often taken as self-evident, usually referred to by such terms as the 
“Judeo-Christian civilization.” A critical historical analysis is found in Mary Anne Perkins, 
Christendom and European Identity, The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789 (2004). For 
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The erosion of this religious legacy through a process of secularization is the 
second characteristic shared by most of the countries belonging to the West. 
Especially in response to the presence of Islam in Western societies, the notion 
of secularism is upheld as a key Western value.43 The third characteristic is that 
in modern times Western countries share certain values that are enshrined in 
constitutions and conventions, such as political principles (democracy, liberal-
ism, political freedoms) and legal principles (rule of law, constitutional rights, 
human rights).
Within the context of these shared values and legacies, however, there are 
distinct differences with respect to the experiences with Muslim communi-
ties and immigrants in the various Western countries, their political and 
legal systems, and their attitudes toward religion. In countries in South-Eastern 
Europe, for instance, Muslims and consequently, the Islamic infrastructure, are 
a century-old phenomenon, whereas in other Western countries the presence 
of Muslims is of recent date. Countries may agree on notions like freedom of 
religion, but interpret it quite differently, which is why the European Court for 
Human Rights makes use of the notion of “the margin of appreciation.”44 And 
later in this article we will see that Western Europe and the us agree on the 
notion of secularism as a principal value, but have quite different interpreta-
tions on its meaning. These differences, however, are merely the coloring of 
otherwise common characteristics of the West.
A listing of states that do or do not belong to the West has little relevance to 
the purpose of our model’s analysis. I prefer to use a restricted definition that 
encompasses only Europe and North America. Others may want to include 
South America, Australia, and perhaps Russia, Israel, and South Africa. The 
point, however, is not to focus on individual countries, but to look for certain 
“Western” commonalities that have a determining influence on responses to 
the practice of rules of Islam in these societies.
a more intellectual historical approach, see Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual. The 
Origins of Western Liberalism (2014).
43 Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin, European Muslims and the Secular State (2005); 
Sarah Bracke and Nadia Fadil, Islam and Secular Modernity under Western Eyes: A Geneaol-
ogy of a Constitutive Relationship (2008).
44 Tom Lewis, “What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of 
Appreciation”, 56 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), 395; Raffaella 
Nigro, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the Islamic Veil”, 11 Human Rights Review (2010), 531; Janneke Gerards, 
“Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation”, 17 European Law Journal (2011), 80.
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2 Two Western Responses to Sharia
If we were to draw up a list of rules of Islam practiced by Muslims in the West, 
and would confront each rule with the question “Do Western values allow this 
rule of Islam or not, and why?” we would be presented with a broad array of an-
swers. At face value, these responses would appear to be diverse. First, there is 
a difference between the many Western countries. For example, in some West-
ern countries police officers and teachers may wear a headscarf, whereas in 
others it is strictly forbidden. Second, the various rules of Islam elicit different 
reactions: some rules are considered controversial, like face veils and certain 
forms of family law, whereas others are applauded or even embraced, such as 
Islamic financial instruments.45
Within this myriad of often-conflicting Western reactions, we may discern 
two general but distinct responses. The first I call the “political-legal response,” 
which corresponds to all norms generated by law and court rulings, and can be 
paraphrased as “this is how we have organized our society.” The second I call 
the “cultural-religious response,” which corresponds to all norms generated by 
the dominant political, cultural, and social norms shared by the majority of 
society, and can be paraphrased as “this is how we do things here.” These two 
responses enable us to obtain a comprehensive picture of the West and its in-
teraction with rules of Islam.
2.1 Political-Legal Response
Western countries share a system of political and civil liberties and institu-
tions, most of which are enshrined in constitutions and treaties. These in-
clude the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and (individual) freedoms. 
I use the term political-legal response to denote all reactions toward manifes-
tations of rules of Islam that invoke these political and legal values. In our case, 
we are interested in such responses to the informal practice of rules of Islam. 
For this, we first need to obtain a better view of the Western political-legal 
response to religion in general. Although recent publications indicate shifts 
in the legal paradigm owing to emergent cultural and religious pluralisms,46 
45 This paradox has been dubbed “good Sharia – bad Sharia” (Ann Black and Kerrie Sadiq, 
“Good and Bad Sharia: Australia’s Mixed Response to Islamic Law”, 34 unsw Law Journal 
(2011), 383).
46 See, e.g., Ralph Grillo et al., Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (2009); Jorgen S. Nielsen 
and Lisbet Christoffersen (eds.), Shari‘a As Discourse. Legal Traditions and the Encounter 
with Europe (2010); Prakash Shah, Marie-Claire Foblets, and Mathias Rohe (eds.) Family, 
Religion and Law: Cultural Encounters in Europe (2014).
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we can discern a few basic features of this response that are of a structural 
nature.47
The most important of these features is that in Western countries, religion 
is subordinate to the overall political and legal national structure. Political and 
legal concepts like freedom of religion and separation of church and state are 
legal means to regulate the leverage that religion may enjoy in a particular 
society. Admittedly, countries differ in the elaboration of these fundamental 
principles. For example, freedom of religion means no state involvement in 
some countries, while it is upheld in other countries by means of active state 
support. In the latter case, formal state recognition of a religious community is 
needed for these communities to establish their theology faculties, to receive 
funds to pay the salaries of their clergymen, to maintain their places of wor-
ship, or otherwise to be recognized as a formal counterpart of the state.
Within these different modalities, religious communities in Western societ-
ies have maintained their institutional and legal infrastructure, parallel to that 
of the state, and are mostly allowed to do so as part of their freedom of reli-
gion.48 Consequently, in most Western countries, Catholic, Protestant, Ortho-
dox and Jewish communities have established so-called religious tribunals to 
regulate their religious family affairs autonomously, outside the state legal sys-
tem. In most Western countries, however, their decisions have no legal power 
and are to be followed on a voluntary basis, a voluntarism that may be subject 
to peer or community pressure, as noted above.
2.2 Religious-Cultural Response
The proposed model holds that many controversies regarding rules of Islam 
in Western societies are not of a political-legal nature, but are prompted by 
societal and cultural objections raised by the dominant normative culture of a 
particular society. Although such generalizations do not do justice to the het-
erogeneous and pluralist nature of many Western societies, a strong majority 
voice has recently emerged in these societies laying claim to “traditional” or 
“national” values. Insofar as these values are based on local custom, a national 
tradition or a dominant social order, but not on the national political-legal 
framework, I refer to them as cultural-religious values. The voice referring to 
these values is often raised in discussions on pluralism, multiculturalism, and 
liberties, and is most prominent when it comes to matters of Islam and, in 
47 Christopher N. Doe, “A Sociology of Law on Religion Towards a New Discipline: Legal Re-
sponses to Religious Pluralism in Europe”, 152 Christian Law Review (2004), 68.
48 See, e.g., Russell Sandberg et al., “Britain’s Religious Tribunals: ‘Joint Governance’ in Prac-
tice”, 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2013), 263.
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particular, Sharia. This voice is the “religious-cultural response” which, in the 
absence of any legal or other concrete reference, can best be characterized by 
“this is the way we do things here.”
For example, with regard to religion, secularism is often referred to as 
 fundamental to Western societies, and as such in contradiction with the newly 
arrived public manifestations of Islam in the West.49 I argue, however, that 
the issue is not secularism, but the cultural tradition of regulating religion. In 
 Europe, the notion of secularism has developed as a dominant public and po-
litical culture that is unappreciative of overt manifestations of religiosity. In the 
us, however, a different tradition of secularism exists, where religion plays a 
prominent role in the public and political domain.50 Manifestations of religion, 
by Islam or any other religion, are therefore likely to clash with the European 
way of handling religion, but less so with the American way. The clash is much 
less prominent, however, if secularism is defined as a political-legal institution 
of separating state and religion. It is precisely this separation that is embraced 
by many European Muslims because it guarantees their freedom to practice 
their faith according to their own wishes and without state interference.51
Although European countries take pride in their secularism, in 2005, in the 
final phase of the European Union Convention working on the “eu Constitu-
tion,” several European government leaders suggested mentioning in its pre-
amble the European identity as Judeo-Christian.52 The proposed amendment 
49 See, e.g., Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (2003); Cesari 
and McLoughlin, supra note 43; José Casanova, “Religion, European secular identities, 
and European integration”, 27 Transit (2004), 1; Olivier Roy, Secularism confronts Islam 
(2007); Armando Salvatore, “Power and Authority within European Secularity: From the 
Enlightenment Critique of Religion to the Contemporary Presence of Islam”, 96 Muslim 
World, special edition “Islam and Authority in Europe” (2006), 543.
50 For comparative analyses, see, e.g., Peter L. Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokkas, Reli-
gious America, Secular Europe?: A Theme and Variation (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2008); 
Jocelyne Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States 
(2004); Barbara D. Metcalf, Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe (Univ. of 
California Press, 1996); Pamela I. Jackson and Peter A. Zervakis, The Integration of Mus-
lims in Germany, France and the United States: Law, Politics and Public Policy (2004 annual 
meeting of the American Sociological Association <http://citation.allacademic.com/
meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/9/2/3/p109230_index.html>).
51 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2005), 204 ff.
52 Madeleine Heyward, “What Constitutes Europe? Religion, Law and Ideology in the 
Draft Constitution for the European Union”, Hanse Law Review (2005), 227–235; Iordan 
Bărbulescu and Gabriel Andreescu, “References to God and the Christian Tradition in 
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did not come to pass, but it illustrates the frequently emotion-ridden debate 
concerning the extent to which Islam can be considered part of European civi-
lization and identity.53
3 The Two Responses Applied: West vs. Sharia
The combination of the political-legal and religious-cultural responses helps 
us make sense of the different, and at times opposing responses to rules of 
Islam. For example, the law may explicitly allow the building of mosques de-
spite nationwide opposition; or the law does not prescribe that hands need to 
be shaken when greeting, yet this may be considered an insult by local custom; 
or, in countries like Kosovo and Albania, wearing the headscarf is not allowed 
at universities, but it is accepted as part of the national culture of these coun-
tries. At times, political-legal and cultural-religious responses concur: interest-
free “Islamic” finance is implicitly allowed by law as part of the freedom of con-
tract, and is accepted in most Western countries; at the same time, polygamy is 
neither allowed by law nor considered acceptable by Western cultures.
Based on these examples, we can draw up a matrix that identifies each rule 
of Islam on the basis of being allowed (or not) by prevailing state law and court 
rulings, and being accepted (or not) by the dominating normative culture (see 
table on next page).
This matrix of political-legal and religious-cultural responses is not in-
tended to be exhaustive, but merely illustrative. And granted, this matrix is 
sketchy and prone to nuance and interpretation: especially the normative as-
pect of the cultural-religious dimension deserves a more complex answer than 
a simple yes or no. But the matrix may help us understand Western responses 
to  “Sharia.” We see that quite some rules of Islam get two opposing responses 
from their Western environment: they can be explicitly or implicitly allowed 
by law, but at the same time not considered acceptable from a cultural or  social 
perspective. This explains the confusion in debates, when the often-heard ar-
gument “that is not allowed” implies a legal prohibition, whereas in practice it 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: An Examination of the Background”, 8 
Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 24 (2009), 207–223.
53 For the argument that Islam is more part of European identity and culture formation 
than generally assumed, see Richard Bulliet, The Case for an Islamo-Christian Civilization 
(Columbia Univ. Press, 2006) and Maurits Berger, A Brief History of Islam in Europe, supra 
note 11.
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(*) Explicit vs. implicit: a state law or by-law may explicitly mention a rule of Islam  
(for example, the burqa ban in France or the ban on ritual slaughter in Denmark),  
or it may implicitly allow such a rule (for example, Islamic finance as part of the  
freedom of contract).









Ritual burial Yes (explicit)(*) Yes Most Western countries


































Yes (implicit) No Most Western countries




















Islamic finance Yes (implicit) Yes Most Western countries





Archbishop of Canterbury; 
Lord Chief Justice of England
echr; several us states
 261Understanding Sharia in the West
journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273
<UN>
is based on customary dos and don’ts. The political-legal “that is not allowed” 
then becomes intermingled with the cultural-religious response “that is not 
how we do things here.” Let us elaborate a few Islamic rules to illustrate this 
mixture of political-legal and cultural-religious responses.
The first example is that of Sharia courts. The only Sharia courts that are part 
of the national legal system in the West exist in the Greek province of  Western 
Thrace.54 In view of the long-standing presence of Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish religious tribunals in Western societies, it would appear that from a 
political-legal point of view an Islamic tribunal should be acceptable. But the 
cultural-religious response against Islamic tribunals is the dominant one. Note 
that the arguments against such tribunals are seldom levelled against the reli-
gious tribunals of the other religions.55
Another example is the so-called burqa ban, or prohibition against wearing 
the full-face veil in the public domain. Bills to this effect have been tabled in 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain in 2010.56 The bill was not pursued 
in the Netherlands and Spain, but in France it became law in 2010 and in Bel-
gium in 2011.57 The reasons adduced by the legislators for such a ban were quite 
diverse, including such political-legal values as equality, freedom, and human 
dignity, but pertained mostly to cultural-religious values like “rejection of so-
ciety,” “problematic for integration,” “burqas are not mentioned in the Quran,” 
54 Supra note 26.
55 An illustrative case is Ontario, where family arbitration tribunals for Jews, Christians, and 
other religious and indigenous communities had existed but were abrogated in 2007, after 
lengthy discussions on the nature of such tribunals, when Muslims also wanted to establish a 
similar tribunal. See Bakht, supra note 8; Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Pro-
tecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Review Report to the Attorney General and Minister Re-
sponsible for Women’s Issues, Ontario, Canada, 2004 <https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov 
.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesummary.pdf>); Sherene H. Razack, “The 
‘Sharia Law Debate’ in Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction In Legal Efforts 
To Protect Women From Culture”, 15 Feminist Legal Studies (2007), 3; James Thornback “The 
Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario”, Appeal Revue of Current Law and Legal Reform (2005).
56 Maurits S. Berger, “Rechtsgronden voor een verbod op de gezichtsbedekkende sluier in 
Frankrijk, België en Nederland”, 3 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid (2010), 96. The 
number of women wearing such full-face veils was estimated at 250 in Belgium (popula-
tion of 13 million), 400 in the Netherlands (population of 17 million), and between 400 
and 2,000 in France (population of 66 million).
57 France: Law No. 2010–1192 of 11 October 2010. Belgium: Wet van 1 juni 2011 tot instelling 
van een verbod op het dragen van kleding die het gezicht volledig dan wel grotendeels 
verbergt, Belgisch Staatsblad 13 juli 2011.
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“oppression of women,” and “disruptive to public order.”58 Voices critical of 
such ban framed their arguments in strictly political-legal terms ( violation of 
individual autonomy and of equal treatment),59 but the cultural-religious ar-
gument appeared more decisive: this is not how we do things here.60
A last example is the ban on “Sharia.” We have discussed the views of the 
European Court of Human Rights on “Sharia” in the Introduction. Several us 
states went further by prohibiting “Sharia” in its entirety. This started with the 
“Save our State” amendment in Oklahoma, in 2010.61 Some other states explic-
itly banned “Sharia law” from being applied by their courts,62 others applied a 
more general ban on any religious or foreign law, and a third category of states 
banned foreign laws that do not provide the same protections as us law does.63 
Two issues stand out here. First, none of these bills define what they mean by 
“Sharia.” Second, there was no history of problems with Sharia or any Islamic 
rule in any of these states: “Sharia” appeared to have been conceived not as 
a practice that needed to be stopped, but to be prevented from ever taking 
root.64 Although the political-legal response (freedom of religion, rule of law, 
58 Berger, supra note 56. For France, see the two proposed bills: Projet de loi interdisant la 
dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public (No. 2520, 19 May 2010) and Proposition de 
loi visant à fixer le champ des interdictions de dissimuler son visage liées aux exigencies 
des services publics, à la prévention des atteintes à l’ordre public (No. 2544, 20 May 2010).
59 This opposition was voiced by the State Councils of France and the Netherlands: Con-
seil d’Etat, Etude relative aux possibilités juridiques d’interdiction du port du voile integral, 
25 mars 2010 <www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/media/document/avis/etude_vi_30032010.pdf>; 
Raad van State, zaaknummer W03.07.0219/ii, 21 September 2007.
60 The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged the French and Belgian bans in 2014 
and 2017, respectively, on the basis of the principle of “living together” (for France, see 
s.a.s. v. France, 1 July 2014, and for Belgium, see Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, and 
Dakir v.. Belgium, both 11 July 2017).
61 H.R.J Res. 1056, 52nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okl. 2010).
62 By 2015, these states included Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. There were other states that had passed similar laws, 
but those were overturned in court. It remains to be seen whether the mentioned states 
can uphold their laws in court.
63 See for discussion of these different alternatives: Muhammad Elsayed, “Contracting Into 
Religious Law: Anti-Sharia Enactments And The Establishment And Free Exercise Claus-
es”, 20 Geo. Mason Law Rev 937 (2013), 943–944; Steven M. Rosato, “Saving Oklahoma’s 
‘Save Our State’ Amendment: Sharia Law in the West and Suggestions to Protect Simi-
lar State Legislation from Constitutional Attack”, 44 Setton Hall Law Review (2014), 659, 
685–692.
64 In Oklahoma, 82% of lawmakers and 70% of Oklahoma citizens who voted in favour of 
the amendment thought it necessary to launch a preemptive strike against any Islam-
ic law infiltrating Oklahoma; Jaron Balou, “Sooners vs. Shari’a: The Constitutional and 
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unambiguity of legislation) would rule against such a ban, these arguments 
were overruled by the religious-cultural response.65
4 The Two Responses Combined: Majority Control
Combining the two Western responses shows that the debates about Sharia 
cover wider issues than law and legal institutions. But there is more to consider. 
In its responses, the West, like any other state system, represents a normative 
system that is enforced through political, legal, and social majority control.66 
The term “majority control” refers to the fact that these systems determine 
what is allowed and what is not, legally as well as culturally. And this, now, is a 
key factor in the interaction between “Sharia” and the “West”.
In Western states and societies, Muslims constitute a minority with little if 
any influence on majority control. Although it is at times suggested by critics 
of Islam and Sharia that the West is struggling to withstand an emerging Sharia 
(“creeping Sharia”), in reality Western legal systems do not have to adapt or 
otherwise give in to rules of Islam. Even if one were of the opinion that rules 
of Islam somehow need to be accommodated by Western legal systems,67 such 
accommodation would be by choice of these systems and not by imposition 
of rules of Islam or by Muslims. Muslims wishing to apply any Islamic rule of 
their choosing are always dependent on the possibilities and preclusions of the 
Western normative context.
 Societal Problems Raised by the Oklahoma State Ban on Islamic Shari’a Law”, 30 Law and 
Inequality (2012), 310, 316–318.
65 The notion of “infiltration” or “creeping Sharia” is heard more frequently in the us than in 
Europe.
66 This definition is based on the notions of “legal system” and “legal culture” as used by 
Chiba, supra note 35; Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, “Legal Cultures, Legal Para-
digms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law”, International & 
Comarative Law Quarterly (1998), 47; Ugo Mattei, “Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and 
Change in the World’s Legal Systems”, 45 American Journal of Comparative Law (1997), 5; 
David Nelken, “Comparing Legal Cultures”, in Austin Sarat (ed.), The Blackwell Companion 
to Law and Society (John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 113–130; Csaba Varga (ed.) Comparative 
legal cultures (Dartmouth, 1992).
67 Marie-Claire Foblets, Jean-Francois Gaudreault-Desbien, and Alison Dundes Renteln, The 
Response of State Law to the Expression of Cultural Diversity (2010); Malik, supra note 34; 
McGoldrick, supra note 9; Prakash Shah, “Transforming to Accommodate? Reflections 
on the Shari’a Debate in Britain”, in Ralph Grillo et al. (eds.), Legal Practice and Cultural 
Diversity (2009), 73–92; Bryan S. Turner and Berna Z. Arslan, “Shari’a and legal pluralism 
in the West”, 14 European Journal of Social Theory (2011), 139.
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It appears, therefore, that the power relations between the Western legal 
system and the rules of Islam represent, in the words of M.B. Hooker, the 
“dominant” vis-à-vis the “servient” rules.68 Although this point may seem self-
evident, it needs emphasis because the issue of Sharia vs. the West is often 
discussed as if it were a conflict between two equal entities. And that is defi-
nitely not the case. The power relations work in favour of the Western legal sys-
tem. This shows, for instance, in the increasing tendency in Western European 
countries to “defend” cultural practices by means of legislation, a defense often 
aimed against rules of Islam, resulting in laws and by-laws concerning dress 
code (headscarf) or social interaction (shaking hands, burqa). The cultural-
religious response is then being transformed into a political-legal response.
5 Security as a Third Response?
The previous paragraph did not address a third, and perhaps the most domi-
nant contemporary response to Sharia, which is the security response. Sharia 
as such, or in some of its manifestations, is at times perceived as a threat to 
the legal order, to social cohesion, or to national security in general. The re-
sponse in this case is not political-legal or religious-cultural, but one of self-
preservation or even self-defense. Is this a third category of Western responses 
that we need to consider? In my opinion, we do not, because this response is 
of a different order. The political-legal and cultural-religious responses stem 
from strongly-held values; security, by contrast, is a self-defense response; it is 
not a value or based on a value, but rather serves to protect those values. This 
is not intended to reject such a response; on the contrary, the self-preservation 
of any nation or society is a factor that drives human behavior. I am, however, 
more concerned here with providing an analytical tool for the underlying fac-
tors (what kind of Sharia are we talking about, and what is the nature of the 
responses to it from the Western environment) than with the security policies 
that may or may not follow from such analysis. I therefore leave security con-
siderations out of the model.
6 Conclusion: A Definition of the West
Based on the above, I define the West in this model as (a) a normative politi-
cal, legal, and social system that (b) shares typical “Western” features, histories 
68 M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (1975).
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and values, and (c) is enforced through majority control. In the case of rules 
of Islam, the Western response can often be reduced to either political-legal 
values that are enshrined in treaties and constitutions, or to religious-cultural 
values that can be best summarized as “that is how we do things here.” The 
conflict with rules of Islam is mostly with the latter: although many rules of 
Islam are perfectly in accordance with Western political-legal values, or 
allowed by them, they are often considered to be in conflict with religious- 
cultural values. I argue that most Western conflicts with Islam that make head-
lines are, apart from Islam-motivated terrorist attacks, issues related to social 
behavior. In some cases, such as the burqa ban in France and Belgium, and the 
Sharia ban in several us states show, these have been legalized.
Part iii Responses by Muslims
The model proposed in this article is based on a dialectic: Muslim  social-legal 
entities want to live in accordance with certain rules of Islam, prompting 
Western legal systems to respond, which in turn creates counter-responses by 
Muslims. This counter-response is what I will discuss in this last section of the 
article.
1 The Effect on Muslims
The cases discussed in the previous section show that most responses to 
 Sharia-related matters are not of a political-legal nature. Indeed, the political-
legal response is often favourable to rules of Islam and their institutionaliza-
tion, but this seldom is a convincing argument. Manifestations of rules of Islam 
receive mostly a negative religious-cultural response. The alleged infringement 
by these rules on religious-cultural values, or its contradiction to such values, 
is often perceived in such manner that the public or politicians ask for the 
protection of these values, at times even under the aegis of national security.
Two effects of this response on Muslims are apparent. On one hand, 
 Muslims in the West embrace the Western political-legal values, at times even 
more than their non-Muslim peers do.69 That is not surprising, because these 
69 Gallup World Poll, Special Report: Muslims in Europe (2007); Gallup, Interfaith Coexist 
Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations (2009), 23–24; European Union Agen-
cy for Human Rights, Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey 
(eu-midis ii) Muslims – Selected findings, 2017. See also Jytta Klausen, supra note 51.
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values guarantee the freedom to live in accordance with one’s religious and 
cultural particularities. Hence the paradox that Western political-legal values 
create the possibility for living in accordance to Sharia. This is what the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury and the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales meant 
in their speeches in 2008.70
It should not be surprising, therefore, that many Muslims in the West 
perceive the Western response being based on double standards: the free-
doms that the West embraces are restricted as soon as it comes to Islam and 
Muslims.71 This second effect is enhanced by initiatives in some Western coun-
tries to legalize certain cultural-religious values, elevating them to the level of 
 political-legal values, such as the ban on minarets in Switzerland or the burqa 
ban in France and Belgium.
2 The Effect of Western Responses on Rules of Islam
Muslims in the West are keenly aware that what they want with respect to the 
rules of Islam may at times not be allowed by law, often because of political, 
legal, emotional, and cultural objections to Sharia. A few Muslims claim their 
political-legal rights by aggressively invoking Sharia, but most maintain adher-
ence to rules of Islam with caution and trepidation. With this is mind, and 
allowing for generalizations, it is possible to point out five ways in which Mus-
lims cope with rules of Islam in light of the array of Western responses: rejec-
tion, adoption, adaptation, conformity, and incompatibility.
2.1 Rejection
Some rules of Islam are not pursued at all by Muslims in the West. What these 
rules are depends on the individual Muslim (as noted, some may not be reli-
gious at all), but the corporal punishments for certain crimes under Sharia may 
serve as an example.72 The punishments for these crimes are explicitly men-
tioned in the Quran and are therefore considered theologically mandatory.73  
But there is no evidence that Muslims in the West have a desire to practice 
70 Supra note 3.
71 There is no literature to support this view, but a quick scan of the Internet shows that this 
sentiment is largely shared by Muslims.
72 These crimes are: theft, intake of alcohol, highway robbery, adultery, and false accusation 
of adultery. Murder and apostasy are also included, but not specifically mentioned in the 
Quran as crimes.
73 Nevertheless, as these punishments are deemed explicitly obligatory under Islamic 
orthodoxy, it is one thing for Muslims to deem them not applicable, but altogether an-
other to condemn or abolish them, which would imply the abrogation of a part of sacred 
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them. This observation, however, is not substantiated by surveys or other re-
search, and the hundreds of Westerners who had gone to join isis in Syria may 
be proof of the contrary.
2.2 Adoption
With regard to some rules of Islam, no compromise is considered possible: 
they are to be adopted in full and unconditionally observed. These rules, which 
pertain to the core of Islamic orthodoxy, are of two kinds: most of them apply 
to the relations between the believer and God (ibadat), and some of them to 
relations between men (mu’amalat).
The ibadat are the rules concerning rituals such as prayer, fasting, slaughter, 
burial, and dress code. Problems posed by Western responses are mostly of a 
practical and cultural nature: prayer may not always be allowed at the work-
place or one may not interrupt work precisely at prayer time; headscarves and 
other Islamic attire may not be permitted in certain workplaces. The opposi-
tion to some religious rituals in Western Europe is becoming increasingly more 
principled, such as ritual slaughter (considered harmful to animal welfare)74 
and male circumcision.75 Because the rules of ibadat represent the essence of 
Islamic belief, Muslims consider any restriction thereof as a de facto prohibi-
tion of Islam.
Some Muslims advocate the adoption in full of the rules of mu’amalat, such 
as the rules of marriage and divorce, gender differentiation, and the ban on 
interest, but this may not always be feasible. Although all these rules are legally 
allowed in Western societies, that is, they are not prohibited, they may encoun-
ter some practical obstacles: religious marriage and divorce are not recognized 
by state courts; gender separation can be practiced in private but not in public 
or in the workplace; and the rejection of financial interest means forfeiting sav-
ings account, mortgages, and the like.
If Muslims feel compelled to observe the rules of Islam that are not al-
lowed or accepted in Western societies, they have two options: either they 
retreat into isolation, possibly within their own community, just as some of 
their Christian, Jewish, and other orthodox peers in the West have done, or 
scripture. This explains the intermediary position of Tariq Ramadan, when he called for 
a “moratorium” on these punishments (posting of 5 April 2005 on tariqramadan.com).
74 Carla M. Zoethout, “Ritual Slaughter and the Freedom of Religion: Some Reflections on a 
Stunning Matter”, 35 Human Rights Quarterly (2013), 651.
75 See, e.g., Resolution No.1952 of 2013 by the European Parliament, which recommends 
further legislative and policy measures to reinforce the child’s right to physical integrity. 
Among the violations of such integrity is mentioned “the circumcision of young boys for 
religious reasons.”
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they try to have the Western legal systems amended so that these accommo-
date the rules of Islam. Examples of the latter are the amendments of West-
ern laws on ritual burial and ritual slaughter (although the latter is currently 
being reviewed in several European countries). Similarly, amendments of la-
bor laws are occasionally made or considered to accommodate Islamic reli-
gious holidays. The most conspicuous amendments have been the changes in 
English fiscal law since 2003, to accommodate Islamic financial instruments 
that are based on a ban on interest (such as mortgages and student loans).76 
Furthermore, the Western private financial sector provides comprehensive 
‘Sharia-compliant’ financial services.77
A third option is the one preferred by extremists, who enforce their pre-
ferred rules of Islam in any way possible regardless of circumstances, resorting 
to coercion and even violence against Muslims as well as non-Muslims.
2.3 Adaptation
Muslims who adhere to a strict observation of rules of Islam are unwilling to 
make the slightest adaptation to these rules. But believers with a more liberal 
inclination may be open to considering the modalities of interpretation. This 
is where the newly developed scholarship of fiqh al-aqalliyat (Islamic law for 
minorities) and the notion of maqasid al-Sharia (purposes of Sharia) play im-
portant roles.78 A few examples are illustrative:
a) A Muslim employee in a fast food restaurant asked whether he was al-
lowed to sell pork sausages. In a fatwa, he was told that as a basic rule sell-
ing or handling pork is forbidden and that he should try to make working 
arrangements to avoid it. If this was not possible, he should find other 
employment. But if he had no employment alternative, he was told: “you 
76 Michael Ainley et al., Islamic Finance in the uk: Regulation and Challenges (2007); Yusuf 
Karbhari, Kamal Naser, and Zerrin Shahin, “Problems and Challenges Facing the Islamic 
Banking System in the West: The Case of the uk”, 46 Thunderbird International Business 
Review (2004), 521.
77 Kilian Bälz, “Islamic Finance for European Muslims: The Diversity Management of 
Shari’ah-Compliant Transactions”, 7 Chicago Journal for International Law (2006), 551; 
McGoldrick, supra note 9.
78 Jasser Auda, Maqasid al-Sharia as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach (Interna-
tional Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008); Dilwar Hussain, “Muslim Political Participation 
in Britain and the ‘Europeanisation’ of Fiqh”, 44 Die Welt des Islams (2004), 376; Moham-
mad H. Kamali, Maqasid al Sharia Made Simple (The International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 2009). See also Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform. Islamic Ethics and Liberation 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2009).
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have to continue to work if you do not have another sufficient source of 
income.”79
b) Are Muslims allowed to participate in the elections and government of 
a non-Muslim majority country? Classical Islamic legal scholarship is 
not specific on the position of Muslims in a non-Muslim majority envi-
ronment, as this situation did not arise at the time this scholarship was 
developed. On one hand, there has been the situation of the Prophet 
Mohammed sending his followers to the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia 
to take refuge from persecution in Mecca. On the other hand, Islamic 
scholarship maintains the rule that “Islam supersedes and should not be 
superseded,” in other words, a Muslim should never be subject to non- 
Muslim authority. The advocates of minority fiqh acknowledged both 
rules, but introduced the “interest” (maslaha) of the Muslim as a third 
consideration that overrides all others, and deemed participation of 
Muslims in non-Muslim elections and government permissible if “the 
interests of Muslims can only be served by this participation.”80
c) In a controversial ruling, the European Council for Fatwa and Research 
stated that a mortgage was allowed for Muslims living in the West with 
the following argument: because it is almost impossible to buy a house in 
the West without a mortgage, and buying a house is a way of upward so-
cial mobility by moving into better neighbourhoods, Muslims would de-
prive themselves of improving their lives if they were not allowed to take 
a mortgage. This, the Council argued, would be contrary to the primary 
purpose of the Sharia, which is to enable Muslims to prosper in life.81
These are three examples of a more liberal interpretation of rules of Islam. Oth-
er Muslim scholars, however, may reach different conclusions.82 This diversity 
in opinions is confusing to some Muslims (as well as to most  non-Muslims), 
but to others it is representative of the flexible and democratic nature of Shar-
ia: Islamic legal science accepts that more than one interpretation is possible, 
79 European Council of Fatwa and Research, Fatwa Nr. 14, 1999 (second session) in Altikriti 
and Al-Ubaydi (eds.) Fatwas of European Council for Fatwa and Research (Islamic Inc., 
n.d.).
80 Alexandre Caeiro, “The European Council for Fatwa and Research”, paper presented at the 
Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, 2003.
81 Alexandre Caeiro, “The social construction of shari’a: bank interest, home purchase, and 
Islamic norms in the West”, 44 Die Welt des Islams (2004).
82 See literature, supra note 38.
Berger
journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273
<UN>
270
depending on time and circumstance, and it is up to believers to choose the 
scholarly interpretation that best fits their personal beliefs.
2.4 Conformity
Another accommodation to Western responses occurs when the rule of Islam 
is considered to be in conformity with the corresponding rule in the Western 
legal system, so that there is no need for a separate invocation or application of 
that rule of Islam. For example, it has been suggested that if one were to fulfil 
the conditions of an Islamic marriage (offer and acceptance of marriage in the 
presence of two male Muslim witnesses)83 when concluding a civil marriage, a 
separate Islamic marriage is not needed.84
Similarly, it could be argued that a divorce obtained in most Western legal 
systems is not much unlike an Islamic divorce (talaq): even though the West-
ern divorce is factually pronounced by the judge, both a Western and Islamic 
divorce are effectively unilateral acts, as the divorce can be obtained by the 
mere wish of one of the spouses, without any legal conditions. A distinct dif-
ference is that in the Western systems both spouses have this unilateral right of 
divorce while the Islamic talaq is the exclusive right of the husband, but under 
Islamic law the husband can grant this right to the wife,85 so that the distribu-
tion of divorce rights conforms to most Western divorce laws.86
Another example of conformity is international relations and international 
law, which are considered compatible with Sharia because their mechanics are 
not different from Sharia or contrary to it. All modern Muslim states make this 
tacit acknowledgement.87 This logic can be taken further, as was done in Egypt 
in 1995: when a team of leading Muslim clerics declared that 95% of Egyptian 
laws were “not in violation” of Sharia, the state declared that this conclusion 
justified the statement that Egyptian laws were, effectively, Sharia.88
83 The presence of an imam is customary, but not a prerequisite under Islamic law.
84 This position is held, among others, by mufti Ebrahim Deassai; Vit Sisler, “European 
courts’ authority contested? The case of marriage and divorce fatwas on-line”, 3 Masaryk 
University Journal of Law and Technology (2009), 51, 65–66.
85 This is the cessation (tafwid) of the talaq.
86 Strictly speaking, Islamic divorce becomes effective upon its pronunciation by the spouse, 
whereas in Western laws it is the court that pronounces the divorce.
87 Maurits S. Berger, “Islam and Islamic Law in International Relations”, in Marie-Luisa Frick 
and Andreas Th. Mueller (eds.), Islam and International Law. Engaging Self-Centrism from 
a Plurality of Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 392, 411.
88 Muhammad S. al-`Ashmawi, al-Shari’a al-Islamiyya wa al-Qanun al-Masri (1996), 10.
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2.5 Incompatibility
Finally, devout Muslims may concede defeat and acknowledge that certain 
rules of Islam cannot be applied or observed even if they believe that they 
should. Rules on gender segregation, for example, cannot be implemented or 
accommodated by a Western state. Muslims may, however, live in accordance 
with these rules within the smaller circles of their families or communities, 
not unlike some orthodox Jewish and Christian communities in the West do.
3 Strategies
The different ways in which the rules of Islam are being practiced in a setting 
that we have called “informal legal practices,” that is, without any enforcement 
other than from within the individual or community, imply that they form an 
intrinsic part of the social dynamics and strategies of Muslim communities. 
Filing a case against one’s husband before a British Sharia council may have 
no formal legal effect, but the shaming and blaming within the community 
can produce better results than any court of law.89 Similarly, Muslim girls may 
circumvent their parents’ choice of spouse by presenting them with an Islamic 
marriage with a partner of the girl’s own choice.90
Similar strategies are used when involving the formal legal structure outside 
the Muslim community. For some Muslims, this may be to assert their identity 
as a strategy for the “accommodation of difference” (the many headscarf cases 
raised by Muslims before the courts across Europe are a case in point).91 But 
such strategies can also be used for opposite ends: litigation before a civil court 
is being used, mostly by women, to right the wrongs of religious law. A woman 
whose ‘husband’ in an informal religious marriage refuses to pay the manda-
tory dower (mahr), can claim this dower through a civil court by considering 
this dower civil part of an agreement, and as such as a matter of civil contract 
law.92 And the Muslim woman who is religiously married may try to persuade 
the civil court that her husband is committing an act of tort by refusing to 
89 Samia Bano, “Muslim Family Justice and Human Rights: The Experience of British 
Muslim Women”, 2 Journal of Comparative Law (2007), 38; Shah-Kazemi, supra note 8.
90 Moors, supra note 7.
91 Malik, supra note 34, at 113.
92 See literature, supra note 27.
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grant her an Islamic divorce by means of talaq (a similar predicament is also 
known to women maried under Jewish law93).94
Research on the extent and nature of these strategies is limited, but it ap-
pears that these uses and abuses by individual Muslims of both rules of Islam 
and Western political and legal infrastructures are not incidental. Further re-
search in this domain is welcome, because it would give a more accurate and 
rounded picture of the nature of Sharia in the West, and in particular of the 
dialectic with its Western environment.
 Concluding Remarks
The main challenge of understanding Sharia in the West is its undefined na-
ture. This is contrary to the ease with which this term is used in public and po-
litical discourse, but also in the legal field, which in the West has always prided 
itself for its precise terminology. The model presented in this article provides 
an analytical tool that gives us answers to and insights in the questions: What 
is the Sharia that these Muslims in the West want and practice, and to what 
extent are they allowed to practice it?
From a Western perspective, these answers and insights are both wor-
risome and reassuring. The worry has to do with the fact that an increasing 
number of Muslims in the West wish to live in accordance with the rules 
of Islam, and that the current examples of such rules inside and outside 
the West are quite alarming: harsh forms of Sharia are being  implemented 
by Muslim countries and organizations worldwide, and terrorist attacks 
are being committed by Muslims who invoke Sharia to justify their ac-
tions. The reassurance provided by this model, however, lies in the forms of 
Sharia practiced by the majority of Muslims in the West, which is limited 
to three domains: religious ritual, family and finance law, and interaction 
93 Michael J. Broyde, Marriage, Divorce, and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law: A Conceptual 
Understanding of the Agunah Problems in America (ktav Publishing House Inc., 2001); Jill 
Wexler, “Gotta Get a Get: Maryland and Florida Should Adopt Get Statutes” Journal of Law 
and Policy (2009), 735.
94 In the Netherlands, courts have shown willingness to interfere, not on the basis of re-
ligious law, but because the unwillingness of the man to religiously divorce his wife is 
considered a matter of tort if they already live as a divorced couple; Maurits S. Berger, 
“Het afdwingen van een islamitische verstoting”, 2 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
(2011), 99. In the uk, this problem has received longstanding legislative and political at-
tention and has been resolved by the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002; Lucy Caroll, 
“Muslim women and ‘Islamic divorce’ in England”, 17 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 
(1997), 97.
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with the non-Muslim environment. The practice of Sharia in the West, there-
fore, is mostly of a private nature and only occasionally clashes with its not-so-
religious environment. In this respect, there is little difference between Islam 
and other religious communities in the West.
Examining the mechanisms of Sharia in the West demands a reassess-
ment of terminology. For a number of reasons, I have proposed to substitute 
the term “Sharia” with “rules of Islam.” In the case of the West, these rules are 
not a static code, but a set of rules practiced by Muslims in an autonomous 
manner, engaged in a continuous interaction with the West. We have defined 
the West as a system that is dominant, not only legally, but also politically, 
socially, and culturally. From this dominant position the West produces two 
responses:  political-legal and cultural-religious. The model shows that many 
rules of Islam as practiced by Muslims in the West do not contradict laws, con-
stitutions, or political values such as freedom or equality. The political-legal 
response, therefore, is mostly accommodating towards rules of Islam. Most of 
the negative  reactions to rules of Islam come from the cultural-religious re-
sponse, defined as the gut feeling of “this is not how we do things here.” This 
response has become dominant to the extent that it often overrides political-
legal considerations.
The ongoing dialectic between rules of Islam and the West encourages both 
sides to re-evaluate what rules can be considered essential, to develop strate-
gies to uphold these rules, and find solutions in cases they conflict with each 
other. The model enables us to study a process that is more dynamic than one 
would initially assume, and which confronts both sides with fundamental 
questions about their legal and religious values, and about the role of religion 
in Western legal systems.
In this ongoing dialectic, I observe several worrisome developments of 
which I will mention two. With regard to the Muslim Westerners, the increase 
in their religiosity is accompanied by an intense focus on the rules of religion. 
This trend of what I call “legalisation of religion” removes the Muslims from the 
spiritual dimensions of Islam, and reduces their life in the West to the rigidity 
of haram-halal (forbidden-allowed). In the case of non-Muslim Westerners, on 
the other hand, I am concerned about the manner how cultural-religious val-
ues are presented, framed, or experienced as being under threat and in need 
of protection. Legislation is increasingly being used to achieve this protection, 
banning practices that political-legal values otherwise allow. Although in some 
instances measures may indeed be justifiable for reasons of state security, I 
argue that by taking this course the West is not so much challenged by Islam, 
but by its own values: is the West willing to live up to its core political-legal 
values as enshrined in constitutions and international treaties, or does it want 
to uphold and even enforce religious-cultural particularism?
